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Nigerian Plantation Workers on Fernando Po in Nigerian Political Discourse and International Relations between 1939 and 1968*

Abstrakt: Artykuł przedstawia kolejne etapy rozwoju gospodarki plantacyjnej w Gwinei Hiszpańskiej, zwłaszcza na wyspie Fernando Po, oraz sposoby sprowadzania siły roboczej zdolnej do pracy na plantacjach kakao. Tłumaczy przyczyny imigracji Nigeryjczyków do Gwinei Hiszpańskiej, zwłaszcza od lat 30. XX w. Tekst przedstawia wpływ cudzoziemskich robotników na oficjalne relacje między rządami w Madrycie i Lagos.

Słowa kluczowe: Gwinea Hiszpańska, Nigeria, kakao, siła robocza, dekolonizacja Afryki, frankistowska hiszpańska.

Abstract: The article deals with the stages of the development of the plantation economy in Spanish Guinea, especially on the island of Fernando Po, and the methods of bringing in the labour force for cocoa plantations. It describes the reasons for the immigration of Nigerians to Spanish Guinea, especially since the 1930s. The paper also presents the influence of foreign contract workers on official government relations between Madrid and Lagos.

Keywords: Spanish Guinea, Nigeria, cocoa, plantations, labour force, African decolonisation, Francoist Spain.

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Introduction

Since the end of the nineteenth century, the economy of the Spanish island of Fernando Po, located in the Gulf of Guinea, has been based on cocoa plantations. The small number of the indigenous population of Bubi people, and its reluctance towards Europeans forced the colonial authorities to bring labourers from the African continent. Since the 1930s, most economic immigrants have been Ibo people from south-eastern British Nigeria. They usually stayed in Spanish estates for several years but had no right to permanent residence. In 1942, the first Anglo-Spanish Labour Treaty for Recruitment was signed, providing the formal framework for migration for the next three decades.

The Second World War caused the growth of African political awareness, which influenced political and social changes in colonial Nigeria. In January 1946, the British colony was divided into three regions: Eastern, Western and Northern. In the following years, the colonial authorities gradually increased the participation of Nigerians in political life to prepare them for their independence, as evidenced by the enacted constitutions: Macpherson in 1951 and Lyttleton in 1954. The Federal Council of Ministers was also established in 1954. Three years later, the Eastern and Western Regions gained autonomous power. Although tribalism and regionalism were at the root of political divisions, Nigeria seemed well-prepared for independent rule.¹

Since the 1950s, Nigerian politicians have regularly visited Spanish estates. They made the increase of legal migration possible in exchange for improving their compatriots' employment and accommodation conditions. On the threshold of Nigeria's independence, the working conditions on the island were widely discussed in the nationalist press until the political crisis in 1966 and the outbreak of the Biafran War. On the other hand, the actions of Nigerian politicians and public opinion were closely followed by the Spanish colonial authorities. When Equatorial Guinea gained independence in 1968, the population of Fernando Po was 78,000 people, 80 per cent of whom were Nigerians.²

The purpose of this article is to examine the role that the subject of the life and employment conditions of Nigerian workers on Fernando Po played in the public debate during the late colonial period and the first years of independent Nigeria. The statements and actions of politicians and the narrative present in the Nigerian press were analysed. The issue of contract workers also touches upon geopolitical matters, especially during the Second World War, but this topic was treated as secondary. The description of British-Spanish relations is limited to cooperation in the field of migration policy in the Gulf of Guinea. In contrast, the analysis of Nigerian-Spanish

¹ T. Falola, A. Genova, *Historical Dictionary of Nigeria* (Plymouth, 2009), pp. XXXVI and 316.

² *The United Nations Demographic Yearbook* (1968), p. 112.

relations was remarkably developed, especially during the period of the Biafran War. The last years of the Nigerian community in the independent Equatorial Guinea were also briefly presented.

The paper shows the successive stages of development of the plantation economy at Fernando Po and the methods of attracting labour. By analysing the migration policy, the article answers the question of whether the Spanish activities were planned or were implemented ad hoc and to what extent the solutions used in other European colonies were implemented on Fernando Po. The social and living conditions of foreign workers in Equatorial Guinea and the influence of such a large number of Nigerians on Equatoguinean nationalists are also described in this paper.

Sources and Subject Literature

This paper is the result of academic inquiries carried out in Equatorial Guinea and the Spanish *Archivo General de la Administración* (AGA) located in Alcalá de Henares. Additionally, press materials published in Nigeria in the 1950s and 1960s were used. Some of them were made available on the Internet by Dr Enrique Martino Martín, a researcher of Equatorial Guinea at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid.³ He is the author of a doctoral dissertation on the recruitment of workers for Spanish colonies, examining carefully the relationship between the ethnic origin of Nigerian workers and the role of their people in Nigerian pre-colonial history. Another PhD thesis on the history of Equatorial Guinea was written at SOAS University in London by Enrique S. Okenve Martinez, who emphasised the social changes among the Fangs caused by European colonisation. Although the author dealt mainly with the history of Río Muni,⁴ the differences in the colonial administration on the island and the continental part were also analysed. The lack of access to direct narrative sources of Nigerians is partially compensated by Anthony C. Oham's master thesis from 2006, based on interviews with workers. Although the transcripts of the conversations were not attached, the author analysed their content meticulously. A similar topic is discussed in the article by Nkparom C. Ejituwu, 'Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency: Its Role in the Mobilization of Nigerian Labor for the Island of Fernando Po', but it focused mainly on agency management.

In Guinean historians' publications, the Nigerians' fate is briefly described. In the classic book by Donato Ndongo Bidyogo, *Historia y tragedia de Guinea Ecuatorial* (Madrid, 1977), the author thoroughly presents changes in the economy of Spanish Guinea but does not analyse the Nigerian political discourse

³ Materials are available at <http://www.opensourceguinea.org> (accessed: 27 July 2020).

⁴ Río Muni – the continental part of Spanish Guinea, situated between Gabon and Cameroon.

on Fernando Po. Similarly, Pedro Ekong Andeme, Minister of Health in the first government of independent Equatorial Guinea, paid much attention to the Equatoguinean economy in his book *El proceso de descolonización de Guinea Ecuatorial* (Madrid, 2010) but omitted entirely foreign labourers. In the historical publication of a politician and an active participant in the described events, decolonisation is expected to be presented as the increase of the national consciousness of the Equatoguineans and their opposition to European colonial practices. However, this does not change the fact that the author mentioned the aid received from independent Gabon or Cameroon while ignoring political cooperation with the Nigerians. The contemporary Equatoguinean researcher Diosdado Mba Nkony in his *La independencia de Guinea Ecuatorial: cuestión prepolítica* (Madrid, 2018), also did not describe the role of the Nigerian community at the end of Spanish rule. Such a presentation of the past events is compatible with the current Equatoguinean politics of memory regarding decolonisation. According to it, independence was achieved thanks to the actions of Equatoguinean nationalists, increased pressure from the United Nations on Madrid to decolonise African possessions and the activity of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando María Castiella, who did not insist on keeping the colonies at all costs, opposite to the Portuguese model.

The Beginnings of the Plantation Economy on Fernando Po

Before the First World War, Spanish Guinea was the tenth largest cocoa producer in the world, and its sales accounted for approximately 97 per cent of the island's export value. Despite that, Fernando Po's economic potential was used to a small extent, as cocoa crops covered only 3.5 per cent of the island's area. By comparison, the cocoa export from the nearby Portuguese St Thomas Island was ten times larger despite the similar natural conditions in both islands.⁵ The difference was due to the availability of labour. The Portuguese brought the inhabitants of their other African colonies (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau) to work. In theory, the plantation labourers were free people and received a salary. Nevertheless, they ended up on St Thomas against their will and could not leave it without special permission. The disclosure of such practices to the European public led British and German chocolate makers to start a boycott of Portuguese cocoa in 1909.⁶

⁵ A.C. Oham, 'Labor Migration from Southeastern Nigeria to Spanish Fernando Po, 1900–1968', MA thesis (Central Michigan University, 2006), p. 41; A. Osuntokun, *Equatorial Guinea-Nigerian Relations* (Ibadan, 1978), p. 24.

⁶ G. Clarence-Smith, 'The Hidden Costs of Labour on the Cocoa Plantations of São Tomé and Príncipe, 1875–1914', *Portuguese Studies*, vol. 6 (1990), p. 153.

The Spaniards in mainland Guinea introduced *prestación personal*, the compulsory work of the indigenous Fang people. However, such activities were primarily aimed at developing local infrastructure, not supporting planters. That system became the cause of a conflict between the colonial authorities and the Catholic Church, which openly opposed it. Furthermore, the quasi-slave labour did not guarantee lower crop costs due to lower productivity and the additional supervision expenses. On Fernando Po, forced labour could not be successfully introduced to the Bubi people because the colonial authorities did not have sufficient military or police forces. Moreover, the indigenous population declined significantly in the late nineteenth century due to disease and social changes. In 1912, the island was inhabited by 12,545 Bubi, which means that the local population was not able to provide a sufficient number of plantation workers, even if they would have had a positive attitude toward it.⁷

First to react were plantation owners who began looking for a workforce on the African continent. Their action was fruitful and successful in independent Liberia. Due to financial difficulties, the government granted Spanish Guinean entrepreneurs a license to search for labour. Volunteers were offered one or two years contracts. After the Spanish defeat in the war against the United States in 1898, the civil administration supported the private initiative. In 1905, the first agreement was signed between the Liberian government and the colonial authorities on Fernando Po. In theory, workers were protected by the institution of the *Native Patronage Organisation* and the *Native Labour Code* established in 1906. The Code was in force until 1940 when it provided a minimum wage and prohibited the employment of minors and women with young children. It introduced a 10-hour working day for men and an 8-hour for women. The Code protected the rights of foreigners to a much greater extent than the rights of indigenous people but was repeatedly violated by planters. Soon, reports began to appear about the appalling working conditions in Spanish Guinea. Despite this, the Spanish-Liberian cooperation continued. The outbreak of the First World War distracted European public opinion from the topic of working conditions in the African colonies. Meanwhile, residents of the vicinity of the Nigerian city of Calabar (situated 160 km away from the island) began to migrate to Fernando Po. As they came to the island illegally, their situation was much worse than Liberians, as they were not protected by any laws. Just before the Great War, it was realised that the island could not develop economically without external recruitment.⁸

⁷ I.K. Sundiata, 'Prelude to Scandal. Liberia and Fernando Po, 1880–1930', *Journal of African History*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1974), pp. 90 and 102; E.S. Okenve Martinez, 'Equatorial Guinea 1927–1979: A new African tradition', PhD dissertation (University of London, London, 2018), pp. 86, 101–02, 117, 132 and 151, <https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/29238/1/10731333.pdf> (accessed: 25 Nov. 2024).

⁸ Sundiata, 'Prelude to Scandal', pp. 103–08; *Osuntokun, Equatorial Guinea-Nigerian Relations*, pp. 27 and 29; Adu Boahen, *General History of Africa*, pp. 723–24.

In the 1920s, a significant decrease in the number of Liberian workers was noticed due to the economic recovery of Liberia. In 1927, Guinean cocoa planters started recruiting in Nigeria, but British authorities introduced a ban on it two years later, as was common practice during the Great Depression. The problem of workforce scarcity led to increased violence and wage cuts on plantations, which turned into an international scandal when the Liberian authorities were accused of engaging in the slave trade of labour for Fernando Po. The League of Nations appointed the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the case. In the published report, Liberia was included, but the Commission had not visited Guinea or brought any accusations against the Spanish authorities. It was found that no organised form of slave trade existed, although workers were recruited by force. The profits went to the Liberian rulers and the military men.⁹

The commencement of the recruitment of workers meant that Spain joined the Scramble for Africa process, involving not only acquiring new territories and natural resources but also a workforce capable of ensuring the colony's economic development.¹⁰ The plantation economy had been dominating on Fernando Po since the end of the nineteenth century due to the geographical location, climatic conditions and the world economic situation. The activities of the Spanish colonial authorities focused on ensuring access to low-cost labour that would have enabled the economic development of Spanish Guinea. The lack of sufficient territorial and demographic resources shattered the plans to popularise forced labour, effectively used in the neighbouring Portuguese islands. Fernando Po's economy was ultimately based on contract work on cocoa plantations. Legal recruitment ensured the island's economic development and solved the moral problem, automatically improving relations between the civil administration and the Catholic Church.¹¹ On the other hand, Río Muni was dominated by quasi-slave labour in the cultivation of coffee trees and deforestation. Thus, dualism was established in the economic development of Spanish Guinea.¹² The outbreak of the scandal over the working conditions of the Liberians had a very negative impact on the island's economy. In addition, it coincided with the world crisis.

⁹ Adu Boahen, *General History of Africa*, p. 733.

¹⁰ D. Denoon, *Southern Africa since 1800* (London, 1972), p. 74, quoted after Adu Boahen, *General History of Africa*, p. 61.

¹¹ In 1938, the forced labour ceased completely in Río Muni, although the relevant convention had been signed eight years earlier; Okenve Martinez, 'Equatorial Guinea', p. 152.

¹² E. Martino, 'Clandestine Recruitment Networks in the Bight of Biafra Fernando Po Answer to the Labour Question 1926–1945', *International Review of Social History*, vol. 57 (2012), p. 41.

Nigerian Workers

The Great Depression caused a decline in cocoa prices in world markets. In 1933, the value of its exports from Fernando Po decreased by 56 per cent compared to 1929, and prices fell by 59 per cent in the same period.¹³ Following the outbreak of the Liberia scandal, colonial authorities dealt harshly with planters committing offences against workers. The situation was so difficult that efforts were made to bring unskilled labour from China and craftsmen from Romania. There were also attempts to reach an agreement with the French authorities to recruit workers from the nearby colonies of Gabon and Cameroon. A treaty was even signed on this matter, but the French party decided to terminate it in 1936. It is worth noting that despite the illegal migration of Nigerians, the Guinean colonial authorities did not conduct any negotiations with their counterparts in Lagos. It was realised that the British were not interested in the economic migration of the inhabitants of their colonies, especially after the slave scandal in the League of Nations. It was considered that recruitment from distant China or Romania was more likely. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the conquest of the sub-Saharan territories by the Francoists made it even more difficult to obtain labour legally, as the governments in London and Paris had recognised the Republican authorities until 1939.

The recruitment of Nigerians could not be carried out legally for political and economic reasons (protection of one's own labour market). Consequently, Fernando Po's economy relied on illegal or semi-legal migration from neighbouring Nigeria, where well-paid Africans were responsible for recruiting. The enlisted workers were transported to the island in convoys of up to 60 boats, with around 30 people in each boat, and it took 15–20 hours to cross from the mouth of the Cross River. This means that as many as 1,800 people could have come to Fernando Po simultaneously. By the way, palm oil, rubber, tyres, and medicines were smuggled. Boats paid regular fees in Spanish ports. Alcohol and perfumes were purchased for smuggling profits, as the Spanish currency *peseta* was completely inconvertible in the British colonies. Contraband on such a large scale was made possible by the irregular shape of the Nigerian coast, making it difficult to keep track of. Illegally recruited were not allowed to settle on the island, although sources do not state how long they worked on Fernando Po.¹⁴

When the Spanish Civil War was over, Franco's government combined the official colonial policy goals with the doctrine of National Catholicism

¹³ Osuntokun, *Equatorial Guinea-Nigerian Relations*, p. 35; O.G. Muojama, 'The Nigerian Cocoa Farmers and the Fluctuations in World Cocoa Prices in the 1930s', *International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 5, no. 19 (2016), p. 231.

¹⁴ Osuntokun, *Equatorial Guinea-Nigerian Relations*, pp. 29–30.

This means that colonial administration and the Catholic Church had convergent aims, as Spanish presence in sub-Saharan Africa was supposed not only to derive economic profits but also to fulfil a civilisation mission and spread Christianity among the indigenous population.¹⁵ At the same time, the Second World War increased tensions between London and Madrid. The United Kingdom feared Spain would have entered the war on the Axis side. British military even prepared a plan to seize Fernando Po. In response, the Spaniards decided to increase the military garrison, and several Spanish journalists proposed annexing large parts of Nigeria.¹⁶ Finally, an agreement was reached that made work legal for thousands of Nigerians and also significantly reduced the scale of illegal immigration.

On 9 December 1942, the first Anglo-Spanish Treaty was signed in Lagos.¹⁷ At that time, 29 per cent of the Fernando Po's area was occupied by cocoa crops, where 10,000 people already worked. It gives us an idea of the scale of illegal immigration. Among the Nigerian labourers, Ibo people dominated, but also Efik, Ibibio, Ijaws, and Ekoi people were present. They came mainly from the provinces of Owerri, Calabar, and Ogoja, which are located in south-eastern Nigeria. The area was characterised by a densely populated area, which caused land hunger. The high taxes in Nigeria, the profitable wages received on Spanish plantations, and the long tradition of Nigerians employed on Fernando Po strongly encouraged emigration. For inhabitants of overpopulated mainland provinces, migration was a natural choice. At the same time, many Ibo moved to newly founded cities or to located in plantations in western Nigeria.¹⁸

According to the treaty, the private enterprise Messrs John Holt and Company was responsible for the recruitment process. Firstly, the enlisted Nigerians were sent to a transit camp located in the former military barracks in Calabar, where the medical examinations took place. They signed contracts for 24 months, with an option to extend them for another year and a half. Workers received 35 *pesetas* a month, paid in two parts: half every month and the rest after the end of the contract. In the following years, salaries regularly increased, especially for employees who were extending their stay.

¹⁵ Okenve Martinez, 'Equatorial Guinea', p. 153.

¹⁶ The territorial claims were based on the borders of Spanish Guinea as proposed by the Spanish explorer José Pellon y Rodriguez in the second half of the nineteenth century; M. Liniger-Goumaz, *Historical Dictionary of Equatorial Guinea* (London, 2000), pp. XXIII and 370.

¹⁷ B. Akinyemi, 'Nigeria and Fernando Poo, 1958–1966. The Politics of Irredentism', *African Affairs*, no. 69 (1970), pp. 236–49 (at p. 237). The texts of the treaties, see <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20205/v205.pdf>, p. 43 (accessed: 20 July 2021).

¹⁸ S.O. Osoba, 'The Phenomenon of Labour Migration in the Era of British Colonial Rule: A Neglected Aspect of Nigeria's Social History', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, vol. 4, no. 4 (1969), pp. 517–18.

Only men aged 18 to 45 could work. Labourers were allowed to bring with them up to two wives and all children under the age of 16.¹⁹ They were provided with alimentation, accommodation, consular protection, support from a British employment officer and freedom of religious practice.²⁰ The maximum number of acquired employees was 250 people per month. The quantity did not satisfy planters because they needed 14 thousand men. This meant that the recruitment should be 500-600 people per month (6,000–7,000 per year), while in 1944, 1,430 workers were legally admitted to the island. Nevertheless, cocoa production did not decrease. Thus, illegal migration remained the primary source of labour at the time. The cost of obtaining an unlawful employee was four pounds.²¹

The working regulations specified in the contract were, at least in theory, very decent, definitely more attractive than those contained in the Native Labour Code. Furthermore, the Spanish administration undertook to fulfil the agreement provisions in case planters would not have failed. The salary payment division guaranteed the cash flow to the relatively poor areas of south-eastern Nigeria, being convenient for the British colonial authorities. The agreement also provided employees and their families with social rights, e.g. eight days of paid leave. Its content was modified many times, but the direction of the introduced changes remained constant. Working conditions continued to improve through increasing salaries or additional benefits (e.g. school for children). In return, immigration quotas were raised, but in the 1940s, the majority of Nigerians were still not protected by any labour law acts as they reached Fernando Po illegally.

In 1950, on the initiative of the General Governor of Spanish Guinea, the existing agreement was modified to meet the requirements of the International Labour Organization.²² The following year, the Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency (ASEA) took responsibility for recruiting Nigerian workers instead of the private company. ASEA also had the right to recruit workers for French Gabon. Meanwhile the entitlements of the British Vice-Consul on Fernando Po widened. It was agreed that one of the ASEA management members would be permanently resident in Calabar. ASEA was also allowed to inspect plantations to check if the contract terms were fulfilled. Admittedly, more information about poor working conditions in Spanish Guinea reached Nigeria,

¹⁹ At the time of going to Spanish territories, most Nigerian workers were not Christians. Many of them were baptised on Fernando Po. It is also worth pointing out that in the 1950s, 62 per cent of Yoruba working on cocoa plantations in southwestern Nigeria had at least two wives; Oham, 'Labor Migration', p. 64; Falola, Genova, *Historical Dictionary of Nigeria*, p. 304.

²⁰ *Archivo General de la Administración*, Madrid, España (hereinafter: AGA), Caja 81, Report of the parliamentary delegation to Fernando Po and Río Muni, Lagos, 1957, p. 3.

²¹ *Osuntokun, Equatorial Guinea-Nigerian Relations*, pp. 39–45.

²² Akinyemi, 'Nigeria and Fernando Poo', p. 237.

but usually they concerned illegal immigrants.²³ In 1953, an official Nigerian delegation headed by the Minister of Labour, Samuel Ladoke Akintola, visited Fernando Po, but found no breach of employee rights. A year later, a significantly modified agreement was signed with Nigeria, and in 1956, the Federal Minister of Labour and Welfare, Festus Okotie-Eboh, negotiated a 25 per cent increase in workers' wages in exchange for heightened quotas to 800 new people a month. The Spaniards paid five pounds for each worker; three pounds went to the federal government and two to the Eastern Region budget. This income constituted a negligible part of the budget for both the central and regional ones (below one per cent).²⁴ In the mid-1950s, the Nigerian population in Spanish Guinea was estimated at 16,000 and was growing dynamically. British and Nigerian authorities supported the emigration since the massive migration solved the social problems in the Calabar area resulting from the high unemployment rates among young men but did not bring real financial benefits to the Nigerian budget.

In 1957, another delegation spent six days in Spanish Guinea inspecting plantations in Río Muni. According to the visit report, the Nigerian population, including workers' families, was determined to be 30,000. The good conditions provided in the Calabar camp (three meals and access to radio) were emphasised. Before boarding, each employee received five pounds, a food allowance, and two blankets. The journey to Fernando Po, by a modern ship equipped with sanitary facilities and running water, took a few hours. After reaching the island, Nigerians went to the next camp in Santa Isabel. A few days later, they were transported to the target plantations. Labourers were exempt from all customs duties. The working conditions in Spanish colonies were generally better than in their homeland. The report shows proper cooperation with the Spanish authorities and the social conditions in Fernando Po. Employees even had access to the swimming pool and hospital. Moreover, a primary school was subsidised by the federal government of Nigeria, an orphanage and a children's hospital.

On the other hand, the report mentions cases of imprisonment without a court sentence, the inability to exchange *pesetas* for pounds sterling and the need to have a pass to travel around the island. The living conditions (overcrowding) and food did not meet the standards in the agreement. The sick people were reduced wages, and employees were sometimes forced to work 12 hours daily. In the eyes of the Nigerians, these difficulties were a symptom of colonialism. To remedy the above-mentioned irregularities, the

²³ N.C. Ejituwu, 'Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency: Its Role in the Mobilization of Nigerian Labour for the Island of Fernando Po', in *The Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Transborder Cooperation*, ed. by A. I. Asiwaju, B. M. Barkindo, and R. E. Mabale (Lagos, 1995), pp. 47–49.

²⁴ R. Olufemi Ekundare, *An Economic History of Nigeria 1860–1960* (London, 1973), pp. 407 and 410.

delegation recommended an increase in Nigerian officials (in Bata and San Carlos) who would report incidents to the Spanish authorities.

Accurate statistics are also included in the report. In September 1957, 23,747 Nigerian labourers, not counting their families, worked on plantations in Guinea. 15,050 signed the first contract, and 8,897 people were on an extended contract. In the twelve months preceding the visit, 9,119 employees were recruited (out of a possible 9,600). During this time, 6,651 workers decided to extend the contract. 3,577 healthy people, 157 sick or injured, and 104 others returned to Nigeria. 450 workers settled in Guinea, and 93 died. As stated in the report, 6,800 migrants came to Spanish Guinea in 1954 and 1955. This means that nearly 98 per cent of workers decided to extend the contract on much better financial terms. If we add the people who died, were injured in accidents and were deported, we can assume that all Nigerians wanted to extend their stay.²⁵ It is the best proof that in the 1950s, working conditions on plantations were very attractive for Nigerians both financially and socially. The figures quoted in the report can be considered credible as they have not been criticised or rejected by the Nigerian press.

A completely different picture of the situation emerges from the memories of Nigerians, collected several decades after the described events in Oham's work. According to eyewitnesses, the working and living conditions on the island were difficult. Most of the recruits were illiterate. Firstly, some of the labourers thought that they would be working in factories, which is astonishing even more so because the industry in Guinea was almost non-existent, and Nigeria itself was also very underdeveloped. Secondly, planters and direct supervisors, both European and African, used violence against workers. Additionally, employees had to wear special markings around their necks like slaves. Their wages were not paid regularly. There was also a serious problem with the salary transfer (mentioned as well in the report of the parliamentary delegation). Thirdly, the accommodation conditions did not exceed the minimum necessary for existence, the buildings were overcrowded, and there were no adequate sanitary facilities. The food quality was poor. There were cases of tuberculosis and smallpox, as well as gonorrhoea and syphilis. Venereal diseases were spread by prostitutes who came to the island officially as workers' wives. Simultaneously, Nigerians had positive opinions on the hospital conditions run by missionaries. Over time, a sense of community was born among the Ibo, who formed an informal trade union. Their representative negotiated with the planters. The memoirs repeat the negative attitude towards Bubi, who were often perceived as thieves for whose crimes innocent Nigerians were punished. The planters even forced children to work, as they were not interested in their education. After returning to their homeland, the situation of many labourers did not improve at all, as

²⁵ AGA, Caja 81, Report, 1957.

they often lost their homes and came back with health problems. Lack of material success abroad meant they were degrading in local social ladders. Although thanks to their stay on the island, they learned foreign dialects (Pidgin English) and languages widely spoken in Nigeria. Their time in Spanish Guinea also influenced their cuisine and faith, as many animists converted to Christianity.

It is worth noting that both sources (reports and memories) mention the same problems, such as the inability to transfer money, restrictions on movement without a pass or forced overtime. The lack of information regarding prostitutes and sexual diseases in the report can be explained as the reluctance of active politicians to describe the immoral lifestyle of their compatriots. Indeed, until the 1960s, Fernando Po played a very important role in the economy of the Nigerian city of Calabar and its surroundings. Nigeria has benefited from both official recruitment and illegal smuggling. In his dissertation, Warren Thomas Morrill included theses contradictory to the accounts collected by Oham. The researcher claims that leaving for the contract allowed for capital accumulation after returning to buy land or start your own business. The good financial situation made starting a family much easier for the former workers.²⁶ The long time that elapsed from their stay on Fernando Po until the memoirs were written down also speaks to the detriment of the credibility of Nigerians' accounts. Unfortunately, the oral reports obtained do not allow us to compare the attitudes of Bubi and Fang towards foreigners. We also do not have information on the migration policy proposed by individual political parties on the eve of independent Equatorial Guinea.

Based on two different historical sources, the delegation report and the workers' accounts, contradictory conclusions can be drawn. Official documents emphasised good working conditions, while the accounts of Nigerians present a decidedly negative picture of life on plantations. Therefore, how could emerging contradictions be explained? It is quite probable that both sources describe the situations of two different groups, legal and illegal workers, in two epochs: colonial and independent Equatorial Guinea. Additionally, it is necessary to consider the distant time perspective (40–50 years) of the workers' relations. At first, the inconvenience was considered negligible due to unemployment and malnutrition in Nigeria. After several decades, they seem very serious, but the interviewees could make ahistorical comparisons. Such an explanation simultaneously gives credence to both types of seemingly contradictory sources. The constant inflow of new migrants is the best proof that conditions in Spanish Guinea, despite the abuses, must have been better than in south-eastern Nigeria. In addition, unskilled workers were provided with an extensive welfare package, almost unheard of in Nigeria.

²⁶ W.T. Morrill, 'Two Urban Cultures of Calabar, Nigeria', PhD dissertation (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1961), pp. 17–18.

Nigerian Public Opinion on Fernando Po

In 1957, the decolonisation of sub-Saharan Africa began when the British colony of the Gold Coast gained independence as Ghana. Simultaneously, the Nigerian nationalist movement was getting stronger and demanded political changes. In response to the publication of the report by the parliamentary delegation, critical publications focusing on the negatives appeared in the Nigerian press. The president of the Nigerian Congress of Trade Unions (NTUC), Lawrence L. Borha, called for the establishment of a permanent Nigerian commission to control the keeping of the labour law in Spanish Guinea.²⁷ Over time, the issue of Fernando Po aroused more and more excitement as the improvement in working conditions for Africans determined the fight against colonialism by Nigerian nationalists. Moreover, the trade unions and other labourer's organizations played an important role in Nigeria's public and political life. Their members still remembered the Liberian scandal regarding the quasi-slavery treatment on Fernando Po.

On the other hand, in Francoist Spain, there was only one legal trade union, *Organización Sindical*, with a vertical structure. It functioned within the *Movimiento Nacional* and grouped workers according to sectors of the economy. In 1957, the political scene in Madrid was liberalised, allowing labourers and workers to create independent self-organisation of a trade union nature.²⁸ In Spanish Guinea, The *Union General de Trabajadores de Guinea Ecuatorial* (UGTGE) was founded outside its borders. UGTGE secretly disseminated the ideas of syndicalism and Catholic social teaching and collaborated with the Equatoguinean nationalist party *Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de Guinea Ecuatorial* (MONALIGE). During the years of autonomy, UGTGE was *de facto* accepted by the authorities. However, plantation workers were not allowed to join the UGTGE or form their own trade unions. Nigerian journalists who visited Fernando Po frequently used this fact in the political struggle.²⁹

In January 1958, the newspaper *West African Pilot* called the autonomous government in Lagos to open negotiations on purchasing Fernando Po. The newspaper justified it by the geographical location of the island.³⁰ The same title accused the Nigerian authorities of forgetting their compatriots abroad in May of the following year. The annexation was also demanded due to the overwhelming domination of Nigerians (over 70 per cent of the population). The newspaper allowed the possibility of federation within one state but unambiguously declared that continuing colonialism was an anachronism.

²⁷ Akinyemi, 'Nigeria and Fernando Poo', p. 238.

²⁸ Liniger-Goumaz, *Historical Dictionary of Equatorial Guinea*, p. 65.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

³⁰ *West African Pilot*, 7 Jan. 1958.

The Nigerian government did not attach great importance to the appeals of extreme circles because cooperation with the Spaniards brought tangible benefits in the form of the emigration of young men from poor areas. Therefore, in 1959 an annex to the agreement was signed, which increased the maximum number of migrants by another 2,000 people within a quarter. In this way, Spanish planters were able to procure up to 17,600 legal workers in a year, and the Nigerian population could have increased to 60,000, which actually happened several years later.³¹

Spanish colonial authorities tracked Nigerian publications about Equatorial Guinea. The Francoist administration acted well in advance at the dawn of Nigerian independence. In 1958, Okotie-Eboh, the Federal Minister of Finance, was again invited to the island. The second visit was synchronised with the annual arrival of the Spanish Navy to the Gulf of Guinea. The minister became convinced of the enormous strength of the Spanish garrison and passed the relevant information to the autonomous government, recognising that any plans for military intervention were unrealistic.

On 1 October 1960, Nigeria gained independence. Parliament and government had been elected a year earlier at the end of colonial rule. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the National People's Congress (NPC), a member of the Muslim North, became the Prime Minister. His cabinet included politicians of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) from the Eastern Region. The role of the opposition was played by the Action Group (AG) from the Western Region, primarily representing Yoruba people. In 1963, the co-founder of the NCNC and Zikism ideology (radical wing of the NCNC), Nnamdi Azikiwe, was appointed to the newly established office of the president of the republic. Mutual competition between regions and struggles for influence in the federal government dominated the political life of the first years of independent Nigeria.³²

The question of workers on Fernando Po played a vital role in the Eastern Region, where most workers came from. However, the opposition, AG politicians, established direct contacts with the Spanish Guineans. In the 1960s, the secretary general of AG visited Fernando Po, where he met Francisco Macías Nguema, later the first president of independent Equatorial Guinea, and Francisco Armijo, an ethnic Spaniard, member of the MONALIGE party. Both activists rejected the possibility of creating a common state of Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. Besides that, we do not have information about any joint Equatoguinean-Nigerian projects of a political nature, in contrast to the cooperation of the Equatoguineans with the Gabonese or Cameroonians nationalists. All political agitation by the Nigerian workers ended with their

³¹ Akinyemi, 'Nigeria and Fernando Poo', p. 239.

³² M. Leśniowski, 'Biafra 1966–1970', in *Konflikty kolonialne i postkolonialne w Afryce i Azji 1869–2006*, ed. by P. Ostaszewski (Warszawa, 2007), p. 448.

immediate expulsion from the island.³³ The lack of Nigerian-Equatoguinean contacts was probably caused by the relatively short stay of workers on Fernando Po, their low political awareness and high illiteracy. Nigerians had relatively limited interaction with other inhabitants of the island. The linguistic, cultural and religious barriers played an important role. Due to their profession, the social position of the migrants was not high, and the indigenous Bubi showed a xenophobic attitude. Although migrants did have some influence on the Spanish colony. Thanks to the workers, knowledge of the Pnglish dialect spread, serving as a lingua franca in Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. Despite mixed marriages or even the settlement of a certain number of plantation workers on the island, it is difficult to talk about the intense interpenetration of the immigrant and local population, which the lack of Anglo-Nigerian threads in Equatoguinean literature may evidence.³⁴

It seems that AG wanted to take advantage of the situation in Nigeria by establishing political cooperation with the Equatoguinean nationalists. A possible gaining of support among immigrants on Fernando Po would have weakened their competitor NCNC. Therefore, AG politicians could have presented themselves as defenders of Nigerian rights and criticize the governmental passive attitude towards the persecution of its citizens in Equatorial Guinea. For Prime Minister Balewa and his NPC party, the issue of Fernando Po was not a priority. He was well aware of the weakness of the Nigerian armed forces. On the other hand, the inactivity of the minor coalition partner, NCNC, the party representing the Eastern Region and Ibo, gave the AG a chance to launch a political attack. These were the most likely reasons why AG, not NCNC, made an (unsuccessful) attempt to coordinate actions with the Equatoguineans. In the following years, the increase of political tensions in Lagos made the AG situation more and more difficult. Its management considered the possibility of starting activities in exile, which would be significantly hampered in the event of the deterioration of Nigerians' relations with its neighbours after the possible annexation of Fernando Po. The change in party rhetoric can be noticed in the *Daily Express*, a pro-AG daily newspaper. Since 1962, publications have been underlining the necessity of improving the working conditions on the island instead of annexing it.³⁵

All cases of mistreatment of Nigerian workers in Spanish estates had been raised primarily by radical nationalists associated with the Zikist Movement, the NTUC trade union and two newspapers: *The West African Pilot* and

³³ In the year of Nigerian independence (1960), 20 of its nationals were expelled from Spanish Guinea for political agitation; Liniger-Goumaz, *Historical Dictionary of Equatorial Guinea*, p. 313.

³⁴ Author's correspondence with Dr Renata Diaz-Szmidt of 23 June 2020.

³⁵ Akinyemi, 'Nigeria and Fernando Poo', p. 247.

The Sunday Times, both edited by Peter Enahoro (pen name Peter Pan). These circles supported the demands of the so-called 'Casablanca Group', i.e. the idea of pan-Africanism based on a radical leftist ideology. Irredentism was characteristic of postcolonial African states, often resulting from the desire to join territories inhabited by the same ethnic groups or areas rich in natural resources. In the case of Nigeria, the prestige related to obtaining the status of a regional power still needs to be considered.³⁶ It is not surprising, therefore, the great aversion towards Spain or Portugal, whose internal systems and colonies were, for these groups, a disposition of all evil and a source of injustice throughout the African continent. When Indian troops entered Portuguese Goa in 1961, an analogous occupation of the island by independent Nigeria began to be considered. It was also realised that Spain did not have the political or military power of the UK or France.

In 1961, four workers were killed in Río Muni. Nigeria immediately launched a diplomatic protest, but the NCNC politicians demanded Fernando Po's annexation. The island's possible seizure was compared to the United States' purchase of Louisiana. In response to the NCNC's actions, the federal government has denied any plans to annexe its neighbours. The positive aspects of contract work in Spanish estates were emphasised. It was also noted that the possible suspension of legal recruitment in Nigeria would immediately increase illegal migration. The government estimated the number of Nigerians to be 40,000, adding that only 23,000 arrived on the island legally.³⁷ The matter was cleared the same year when another annexe to the 1956 agreement was signed, providing compensation for workers injured in accidents and free movement of Nigerians in Spanish Guinea. The Nigerian delegation concluding the agreement set the number of their compatriots on the island at 50,000. The amendments were to apply for the next five years, but the tense political situation inside Nigeria in 1966 made it impossible to introduce further changes.³⁸

In the following years, the issue of the annexation of Fernando Po returned several times in the public debate in Nigeria, but was never presented as the official position of the government in Lagos. In 1962, at the annual NCNC convention, the Zikists demanded the annexation of the island. In February 1962, *West African Pilot* published a three-phase plan to capture the island. As a first step, the Lagos government should send Nigerian missionaries to teach their fellow countrymen on Fernando Po. Then, the best students should be offered scholarships at home. Finally, calls were made for the deployment of an armed force.³⁹ Apart from the reality of the plan mentioned above, the

³⁶ P. Nugent, *Africa since independence* (New York, 2004), p. 71.

³⁷ Oham, 'Labor Migration', p. 38.

³⁸ Akinyemi, 'Nigeria and Fernando Poo', pp. 239–40.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

purpose of the text was to stimulate discussion about the possible annexation of the island. Another example of an attempt to impose discourse on the government is the series of articles by Peter Enahoro, published after he visited Fernando Po in 1962. The text deliberately cites false demographic data, overstating Nigerian and European populations at Bubi's expense. The author accused politicians of signing the contracts and *de facto* accepting the terrible conditions of workers on the island. Of course, he also blamed the Spaniards, the Catholic Church and the Nigerians themselves, who knew the situation and kept coming to work on the plantations.⁴⁰

In this way, extreme nationalists tried to convince the public opinion that seizing Fernando Po from Europeans would have confirmed the strength of the newly founded Nigeria. Such action would have been justified by citizen protection and the fight against colonialism and Spanish fascism. Any political or military victory over Spain would have proved the power of a post-colonial African state capable of imposing its will on Europeans. At the same time, Nigeria would have proved itself to be a regional power in the Gulf of Guinea. On the other hand, supporters of such a procedure did not consider the costs caused by the conflict with Spain or the actual capabilities of the Nigerian armed forces. Nigerian more vigorous action towards Fernando Po would have worsened its relations with other African neighbours, who would have feared aggression from its larger neighbour.

Paradoxically, the appearance of the subject of the annexation of Fernando Po in the public debate in Nigeria was beneficial to the Spanish authorities, which gained another argument for staying in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1962, a decision was made to strengthen the military garrison, which finally was not implemented for political reasons.⁴¹ Moreover, the governments in Lagos and Madrid were well aware that the possible annexation of Fernando Po would mean the partition of Spanish Guinea. It would have been hard to imagine that the economically weaker Río Muni would have been able to survive independently. It would most likely be occupied by neighbouring Gabon or Cameroon, whose population (Fangs) were closely related to the inhabitants of the Spanish possessions. The Francoist government wanted to prevent the outbreak of a possible armed conflict, similar to the civil war in the Congo (Katangese secession), which began immediately after the Belgian colony gained independence. For these reasons, it was not decided to separate Fernando Po and Río Muni and then to create two independent states, although such proposals were made at the Constitutional Conference of Equatorial Guinea.⁴²

⁴⁰ *Sunday Times*, 18 Feb. 1962; Akinyemi, 'Nigeria and Fernando Poo', pp. 241–42.

⁴¹ Okenve Martinez, 'Equatorial Guinea', p. 304.

⁴² P. Kruze, 'Koncepcje ustroju politycznego w kolonialnej Gwinei Hiszpańskiej i w niepodległej Gwinei Równikowej', *Afryka*, no. 47 (2018), p. 65.

In 1967, Nigeria's Eastern Region declared secession and the independent Republic of Biafra was proclaimed. Immediately, the Nigerian civil war began. Secessionists tried to present the conflict as a clash between the Muslim North and the Catholic South, which, to some extent, brought tangible benefits. Spain assisted the Republic of Biafra because it was 'Christian, anti-communist and anti-British', although its commitment was not as significant as that of Lisbon.⁴³ At the same time, the illegal smuggling of people and goods, including weapons, to Fernando Po increased significantly. With the advances of the Nigerian army and the defeat of the Biafran army, the number of refugees targeting the island grew.⁴⁴

The war broke out at the end of the Spanish presence in sub-Saharan Africa. Equatorial Guinea gained independence on 12 October 1968. The first Equatoguinean president, Francisco Macías Nguema, very quickly liquidated the democratic institutions; then he assumed totalitarian power based on his compatriots, the Fang people of Río Muni. As early as 1969, most Spaniards left Equatorial Guinea, negatively affecting cocoa, coffee and wood production. From 1970, Nigerians began to leave the island *en masse*. In 1975, their recruitment was suspended, and a year later, the last of them returned to their homeland. Consequently, Macías Nguema ordered the forced recruitment of Fangs capable of working on plantations. We cannot clearly state the factors driving the first President of Equatorial Guinea to force the Nigerians to leave. However, we can assume that he saw the Nigerians as a potential fifth column and feared the Nigerian invasion of Fernando Po. At the same time, he realised that Fangs could have replaced the foreigners. However, this does not change the fact that Macías Nguema's actions did result in a drop in cocoa exports from thirty thousand tons up to two thousand tons, that is, to the levels from the beginning of the twentieth century. In addition, labour recruitment was compulsory, which was also introduced 70 years earlier by the colonisers.⁴⁵ Thus, the more than 150-year presence of the people of today's Nigeria on Fernando Po ended.

Conclusion

The lack of necessary manpower for the plantation economy was severe in most European colonies in the Gulf of Guinea. Nonetheless, a unique solution

⁴³ E. Martino, 'Touts and Despots: Recruiting Assemblages of Contract Labour in Fernando Pó and the Gulf of Guinea, 1858–1979', PhD dissertation (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, 2017), p. 210, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320820327_Touts_and_Despots_Recruiting_Assemblages_of_Contract_Labour_in_Fernando_Po_and_the_Gulf_of_Guinea_1858-1979 (accessed: 25 Nov. 2024).

⁴⁴ AGA, Caja 81/11849.

⁴⁵ Martino, 'Touts and Despots', p. 523.

to this problem was applied in Spanish Guinea. It was decided to base the plantation economy of the island of Fernando Po on voluntary contract work of foreign labourers, in contrast to Río Muni, where forced labour of the indigenous people dominated. The initiative came from the plantation owners but was quickly supported by the colonial administration. After the victory of the Francoists in the Spanish Civil War, the actions of the colonial authorities and the Catholic Church became convergent. The new regime began with giving up forced labour and starting efforts to regulate illegal emigration from neighbouring British Nigeria. The Francoist colonial authorities constantly expressed an interest in the working and living conditions of foreigners to avoid the potential accusations of tolerating quasi-slavery in Spanish Guinea and repeating the scandal with Liberia and the League of Nations. Moreover, ensuring good working conditions was consistent with Catholic social teaching and the doctrine of National Catholicism. Although there was labour exploitation, working on Fernando Po had to be more profitable than in Southeast Nigeria. The number of migrants grew steadily, and in the 1950s, foreigners began to constitute the majority of Fernando Po's inhabitants.

The scale of the migration of Nigerian workers to Fernando Po in the 1950s and 1960s was possible thanks to the earlier presence of foreigners in Equatorial Guinea and the substantial capital invested in plantations. The signing of the migration agreement in 1942 brought significant economic benefits to the colonial authorities on Fernando Po and political and military benefits to the British. As a result, the recruitment to the Spanish colony had not been stopped; on the contrary, it gained momentum. In the 1950s, Nigerian politicians became interested in Fernando Po during the transition to independence because it helped to stoke up nationalist sentiments. This theme was mainly used for the purposes of internal politics and inter-party struggle. It did not play a leading role and had no direct influence on the shape of Nigerian foreign policy. On the other hand, in the press discourse, it could take extreme forms, including calls for the annexation of Fernando Po. The extreme circles centred around the Zikist Movement put forward such a claim, thus trying to get into the mainstream of public life. The federal government had never officially demanded the annexation of Spanish territory.

At the same time, African irredentism was used by Spain as an argument for maintaining its presence in the Gulf of Guinea. The government in Madrid closely followed the internal political debate in colonial and then independent Nigeria. Simultaneously, the Spanish authorities wanted to avoid an armed conflict. After the destabilisation of the Nigerian political scene in 1966 and the outbreak of the civil war, the leaders of the secession seemed well aware of the strategic position of Fernando Po, allowing air transport to Biafra. For this reason, they tried to gain the support of Spain but did not use the argument of the Nigerian population on the island. Instead, they called for Christian solidarity.

Historical sources are silent about the cooperation between workers and the members of emerging anti-colonial movements on Fernando Po. Instead, we have information about the forming community among workers from the Ibo people. The lack of political cooperation was evident in the first years of independent Guinea when Nigerians were forced to leave the newly formed state. It can be assumed that the Equatoguinean nationalists around President Francisco Macías Nguema saw foreigners as a destabilising factor and a threat to Equatoguinean sovereignty. This explains the order for Nigerians to leave Equatorial Guinea despite the disastrous economic consequences.

Summary

The history of Equatorial Guinea, the only Spanish colony in sub-Saharan Africa which gained independence in 1968, is an interesting subject for research due to its affiliation with Spain, an internationally isolated state after the Second World War. The colony encompassed the island of Fernando Po, the administrative centre, and the mainland part of Río Muni. The two areas did not share a common history, culture, or language. For this reason, a dualistic economic structure was created in the colony. Fernando Po was dominated by a plantation economy based on the work of contract immigrants.

The article presents the stages of the development of the plantation economy in Spanish Guinea, especially on the island of Fernando Po, and the methods of bringing in the labour force for cocoa plantations. It describes the reasons for the immigration of Nigerians to Spanish Guinea, especially since the 1930s. The actions and statements of Nigerian politicians are also analysed in the context of plans for the annexation of Fernando Po by the government in Lagos in the 1950s and 1960s. The other section describes the influence of many foreign workers on official relations between the authorities of independent Nigeria and on the perception of nationalist ideas by the indigenous inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea.

The article contributes to a better understanding of the nature of Spanish colonialism in the Francoist era, which had a specific character resulting from the political system of the metropolis. The source material was collected during scientific research at the Spanish *Archivo General de la Administración* in Alcalá de Henares. Additional query was conducted in Nigerian newspapers.

Nigeryjscy pracownicy plantacji na Fernando Po w nigeryjskim dyskursie politycznym i stosunkach międzynarodowych w latach 1939–1968

Dzieje Gwinei Równikowej, jedynej hiszpańskiej kolonii w Afryce Subsaharyjskiej, stanowią ciekawy przedmiot badań historycznych ze względu na jej przynależność do Hiszpanii, która po zakończeniu II wojny światowej była izolowana na arenie międzynarodowej. W skład kolonii wchodziła wyspa Fernando Po, będąca centrum administracyjnym, oraz część kontynentalna Río Muni. Obu obszarów nie łączyła wspólna historia, kultura ani język. Z tego powodu w kolonii wytworzyła się dualistyczna struktura ekonomiczna, a na Fernando Po dominowała gospodarka plantacyjna opierająca się na pracy kontraktowych imigrantów.

Artykuł przedstawia kolejne etapy rozwoju gospodarczego wyspy oraz sposoby sprowadzania siły roboczej zdolnej do pracy na plantacjach kakao. Tłumaczy przyczyny imigracji Nigeryjczyków do Gwinei Hiszpańskiej, która nasiliła się w latach 30. XX w. Następnie analizuje działania oraz wypowiedzi polityków nigeryjskich w kontekście planów aneksji

Fernando Po przez Nigerię w latach 50. i 60. XX w., a dalszej części opisuje rolę dużej liczby cudzoziemskich robotników na oficjalne stosunki między władzami niepodległej Nigerii i kolonialnej Gwinei Równikowej oraz ich wpływ na postrzeganie idei nacjonalistycznych przez autochtonicznych mieszkańców Gwinei.

Artykuł niewątpliwie przybliży hiszpański kolonializm w epoce frankistowskiej, która miała szczególny charakter wynikający z ustroju politycznego metropolii. Materiał źródłowy zebrano podczas kwerendy naukowej w *Archivo General de la Administración* w Alcalá de Henares oraz w prasie nigeryjskiej.

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