Dzieje Najnowsze, Vol. LVI – 2024, 4
PL ISSN 0419-8824

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Polish Africanist Society

Continuum of Violence: Concentration Camps in Kenya

Abstrakt: Celem artykułu jest omówienie obozów koncentracyjnych zakładanych w Kolonii Kenii przez Brytyjczyków (1952–1960) oraz obozów koncentracyjnych tworzonych przez kenijską administrację w Prowincji Północnowschodniej (1963–1967). Odtworzono system obozów, do których trafiać mieli powstańcy Mau Mau oraz przedstawiono działania władz niepodległej już Kenii względem mniejszości somalijskiej w okresie tzw. *shifta war*.

Słowa kluczowe: Afryka, Kenia, obozy koncentracyjne, Mau Mau, Kikuju, Somalijczycy, *shifta war*.

Abstract: The purpose of the article is to discuss the concentration camps established by the British in the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in 1952–60 and by Kenyan authorities in North Eastern Province in 1963–67. Reconstructed is the system of camps established for the purpose of incarcerating the Mau Mau rebels. Also discussed are actions taken by the authorities in independent Kenya toward the Somali minority during the so-called Shifta War.

Keywords: Africa, Kenya, concentration camps, Mau Mau, Kikuyu, Somalis, Shifta War.

> We were not elected by the will of the people, we are supreme here through our moral superiority, by the force of circumstances, by the will of Providence.[1]

The postcolonial history of Sub-Saharan Africa has served as a plentiful source of inspiration for scholars within the so-called genocide studies.

[1] British colonial officer John Lawrence, quoted after G.F. Maclear, *The Christian Statesman and Our Indian Empire* (Cambridge, 1859), p. 14.

http://doi.org/10.12775/DN.2024.4.06

Among works within this current of thought published around the turn of the twenty-first century, there are numerous monographs on genocides, massacres, and genocidal acts of ethnic cleansing in places such as Rwanda, Sudan, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or the Central African Republic.[2] In their inquiries into the mechanisms of mobilisation for genocide, scholars typically focus on such motivating factors as the structural weakness of fragile or failed states, the power of tribalism and inter-tribal ressentiments, and 'racial' or religious hatred. Such a perspective results in the downplaying of the role of the period of the 'Scramble for Africa' – the rivalry between European empires for territories south of the Sahara and the policies they employed there – in the contemporary instability of the African political scene. Relatively few synthetic studies highlight the direct ties between violence in the colonial era and lawlessness after independence,[3] or between the genesis of the concentration camps and the so-called dirty wars – conflicts outside of Europe, often waged with the use of mercenary troops.[4] One inspiration for such a study comes from events that took place in Kenya in the 1950s and 1960s, when concentration camps operated in the country, housing prisoners that belonged to social groups with shared ethno-political identities.[5] Originally, camps of this type were established by the British, and their inmates were recruited from among the natives – especially members of the Kikuyu people. After Kenya gained independence, new camps were created in the North Eastern Province, housing primarily native Somalis. By then, the Kikuyu were in power, some of whom had previously experienced oppression and violence at the hands of the British.

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[2] Among Polish scholars – chiefly political scientists and experts in international relations – the one genocide in Africa that has received the keenest interest are the events in Rwanda in 1994; see: J. Reginia-Zacharski, *Rwanda. Wojna i ludobójstwo* (Warszawa, 2012); J. Bar, *Po ludobójstwie. Państwo i społeczeństwo w Rwandzie 1994–2012* (Kraków, 2013); id., *Rwanda* (Warszawa, 2013).

[3] See, e.g.: *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, ed. A.D. Moses (New York, 2008); T.J. Stampleton, B. Kayitesi, *A History of Genocide in Africa* (Santa Barbara–Denver, 2017).

[4] *Vide* the actions of the Spanish in Cuba in 1896, of the British in the Orange Free State and Transvaal, of the Americans in the Philippines in 1899–1902, or of the Germans in today's Namibia, 1904–07; see: J. Hyslop, 'The Invention of the Concentration Camp: Cuba, Southern Africa and the Philippines, 1896–1907', *South African Historical Journal*, vol. 63, no. 2 (2011), pp. 251–76; L. Nijakowski, *Rozkosz zemsty. Socjologia historyczna mobilizacji ludobójczej* (Warszawa, 2013), p. 135.

[5] For the purposes of this article, the name 'concentration camp' is applied to detention facilities established beyond the regular prison system. Prisoners in the camps were held in extreme conditions for reasons of military or political isolation, criminal punishment, or exploitation. Imprisonment, a means of political terror, follows a sentence of a court or a military order and applies to persons belonging to a stigmatised social category. Cf. W. Sofsky, *The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp*, trans. W. Templer (Princeton, 1997).

The purpose of this article is to discuss the *sui generis* continuum of violence between the colonial and postcolonial era – a case of victims turning into perpetrators. It must be stressed here that this process had nothing to do with political revenge: the Somalis who entered the camps in independent Kenya had not collaborated with the former colonial authorities. What the authorities in Nairobi did amounted to nothing more than the implementation of solutions that were tested a decade before – and the British helped them along by providing materiel. Sociologist identify phenomena of this kind as instances of (post)colonial mimicry – the imitation of behaviours of the coloniser (the British) by the colonised (in this case, the Kikuyu) that blurs the line between the two and legitimises the political status of the elites in a society undergoing a political transformation.[6]

The Mentality of a State of Emergency

On 20 October 1952, a state of emergency was announced in Kenya Colony in response to preparations for an armed insurrection by the natives. For the Africans, the move was tantamount to a 'declaration of war'.[7] The British dispatched eleven battalions of infantry into the forests of Kenya, along with tens of thousands of police officers and paramilitary troops. They also implemented a systematic programme of persecution of members of the Kikuyu ethnic group. As part of their counter-insurrectionary action, they created a network of concentration camps, isolation camps, and high-security prisons.

The colonial violence was aimed primarily against the Kikuyu. As anthropologist Ryszard Vorbrich argued, they comprised 'a society of segmented systems, absent of centralised power and bound together by kinship, shared religion, and mores, whose organs of leadership and conflict resolution only ever emerged in an *ad hoc* fashion'.[8] The Kikuyu remain the most numerous people of Kenya today (c. 17 per cent of the population);[9] they were the primary recruiting base of the Mau Mau rebels.

The origin of the term 'Mau Mau' is not entirely clear; it is typically associated with *muma*, the Kikuyu word for 'pledge'. It bears highlighting

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[6] H. Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry and Man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse', in: id., *The Location of Culture* (London, 1994), pp. 85–92.

[7] M. Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London, 2005), p. 85.

[8] R. Vorbrich, *Plemienna i postplemienna Afryka. Koncepcje i postaci wspólnoty w dawnej i współczesnej Afryce* (Poznań, 2012), p. 112. For more on the developments in the social organisation of the Kikuyu in colonial times, see: G. Muriuki, *A History of the Kikuyu, 1500–1900* (Oxford, 1974).

[9] J. Horowitz, *Multiethnic Democracy. The Logic of Elections and Policymaking in Kenya* (Oxford, 2022), pp. 14–15.

that public pledges are a crucial element of social control among many African peoples, not just the Kikuyu.[10] The custom gained in popularity in Kenya around the mid-1940s, after thousands of Africans who had fought on the frontlines of the Second World War returned home – a period that saw the Kikuyu be subjected to a series of land dispossessions and additional financial burdens, as well as a ban on cultivating the most lucrative plantation crops (tea, coffee, sisal).[11]

Muma was not a mystical pact initiating a bloody insurrection of the barbarians, as the British had claimed. What it did constitute, as Polish reporter Genowefa Czekała-Mucha colourfully described it, was 'an expression of self-defence, the abandonment of an inferiority complex toward Europeans, a sense of revitalisation'.[12] *Muma* was a native response to modernisation and increasing economic and political marginalisation, an instrument serving the purpose of strengthening communities.

Colonial authorities accused the Africans who took the pledge of plotting an armed insurrection. The British propaganda discourse about the rebels combined two seemingly mutually contradictory visions. On the one hand, the Mau Mau were presented as the bearers of the ethnic extremism of bloodthirsty savages – an atavistic, anti-European, and anti-Christian sect among the Kikuyu who used primitive terror to sabotage the British mission of civilising Kenya. On the other, the Mau Mau were described as a perfectly orderly mafia-style organisation whose cells were distributed across the colony. They were also said to harbour communist sympathies. The combination of these stereotypes – the barbarian and the terrorist – fostered an image of the enemy of the Empire.[13] A poignant description of the evolving social mentality of the colonisers is offered by Caroline Elkins:

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[10] J. Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya. The Traditional Life of the Gikuyu* (Nairobi – Kampala – Dar es Salaam, 2004), pp. 282, 301. Authored by independence activist and first President of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta, this book grew out of his doctoral dissertation, defended under the tutelage of Bronisław Malinowski at London School of Economics.

[11] For more on the politico-economic changes that prompted the political radicalisation of the Kikuyu, see: M. Pawełczak, 'Ruch Mau-Mau w Kenii 1950–1957', in: *Konflikty kolonialne i postkolonialne w Afryce i Azji 1869–2006*, ed. P. Ostaszewski (Warszawa, 2006), p. 359; H. Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton, 1974), pp. 27–29; B. Berman, 'Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Modernity: The Paradox of Mau Mau', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 25, no. 2 (1991), pp. 181–206.

[12] G. Czekała-Mucha, *Uhuru* (Warszawa, 1978), p. 99. Such works of non-fiction were relatively plentiful in the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. Most of their authors explicitly sought to glorify anti-Western national liberation movements of a Marxist bent.

[13] These views predominate in English-language works on the Mau Mau produced in the 1960s; see, e.g.: D. Barnett, K. Njama, *Mau Mau From Within* (London, 1966); F. Majdalany, *State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau* (Boston, 1963); C. Rosberg, J. Nottingham, *The Myth of Mau Mau* (New York, 1966). The same applies to memoirs of those who participated in quelling the rebellion; see, e.g.: W. Baldwin, *Mau Mau Man Hunt: The Adventures of the Only American Who Has Fought the Terrorists in Kenya* (New York, 1957).

> Virulent racist ideology grew more intense over time as the so-called native was moved along the racist spectrum from stupid, inferior, lazy, and childlike to savage, barbaric, atavistic, and animal-like. […] The nature and demands of Mau Mau led to an even greater pathological fear by whites of the Kikuyu. […] There was a shift in language and belief, from simple white supremacy to one that was overtly eliminationist.[14]

In practice, Mau Mau engaged in acts that could be characterised as sabotage; they were also not a tribal sect, being recruited from among the Kikuyu, as well as the Embu, Meru, Kamba, and Maasai. It is of note that among their victims, there were far fewer Europeans than Africans who espoused loyalist attitudes toward the London authorities. It is estimated that over the course of eight years since the announcement of the state of emergency, Mau Mau attacks claimed the lives of a total of 32 European settlers, roughly 200 British soldiers, and around 2,000 loyalists.[15] One might well entertain the claim that, had the British 'held the balance', as historian of Africa Basil Davidson poignantly observed,[16] and refrained from announcing the state of emergency, Mau Mau activities could have remained limited to the continuation of sporadic sabotage, and the East African colony could remain in British hands even until the mid-1970s.[17]

Isolation

As Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe claimed, citing the works of German lawyer and political scientist Carl Schmitt, in which he conceptualised the state of exception and sovereignty,[18]

> Colonial power is in no way structured by the opposition between the legal and the illegal. Colonial law is unconditionally subject to political imperatives. […] Colonial war […] is, by definition, a borderless war, outside of law. Once the occupation is assured, the subjugated population is never entirely shielded from a massacre. […] the state of exception and the relation of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to kill.[19]

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[14] C. Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York, 2005), pp. 12, 47–48.

[15] C. Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire* (Hammersmith, 2014), p. 237.

[16] B. Davidson, *Modern Africa: A Social and Political History*, 3rd edn (London, 1994), p. 143.

[17] Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p. 87.

[18] C. Schmitt, *Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to Proletarian Class Struggle*, trans. M. Hoelzl and G. Ward (Cambridge, 2014); id., *Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*, trans. G.L. Ulmen (New York, 2007).

[19] A. Mbembe, *Necropolitics*, trans. S. Corcoran (Durham, 2019), pp. 26, 70.

This account describes the events in Kenya during the 1950s: the winding of the spiral of hate and the mobilisation to genocide.

The first step the British took against the Mau Mau was to isolate the political leaders and activists of the Kenya African Union (KAU), first and foremost Jomo Kenyatta – wrongly perceived as the head of the rebellion.[20] In October 1952, 187 persons were arrested; KAU leaders were interned and, after a brief show trial, sentenced to seven years in prison and hard labour. They found themselves in facilities located at the peripheries of the colony – for instance, in Lokitaung, in the desert near the contemporary border between Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia.[21]

Concurrently, about a thousand Kikuyu were condemned to death by hanging by summary judgment.[22] These sentences followed the principle of group responsibility. The Kikuyu would share prisons with petty criminals or be transferred to newly-created internment facilities in Athi River, Kajiado, or on the island of Lamu. Closed villages were created within reservations, treated as occupied territory and subject to the rules of a 'police state'.[23] In towns and villages, ghettoes were created, bounded by barbed wire, ditches, and moats. In farms within the interior, mini-work camps and so-called open camps appeared; the Kikuyu who ended up there became slaves to White planters. Mass relocations were instituted in an effort to sever Mau Mau partisans from the support of their families. The state of emergency legislation provided justification for the confiscation of property belonging to suspected partisans. In the interest of European farmers,[24] the Kikuyu who lived outside of reservations (especially the so-called squatters – contract labourers) were deported on the basis of a governor order which allowed the isolation of anyone suspected of having made the pledge. The Kikuyu, along with the Embu and the Meru, were transported into reservations on cattle cars and trucks. When they arrived, they did not integrate with the population already within – instead, they engaged in rivalry for quickly declining resources of water and food.[25]

Soon, the British decided to form so-called detention camps for the purposes of massing together prisoners (convicted without trial) in enclosed locations and forcing them into slave labour. The biggest of these camps were located in Nakuru, Gilgil, and Thomson's Falls. The living conditions in these locations were extreme; the inmates were held in huts fashioned of corrugated iron or mud. The area was surrounded with a fence and barbed

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[20] M. Pawełczak, *Kenia* (Warszawa, 2004), p. 177.

[21] K. Wójtowicz, *Partia w mechanizmie władzy państw Afryki Wschodniej* (Wrocław, 1980), p. 44.

[22] Pawełczak, *Ruch Mau-Mau w Kenii 1950–1957*, p. 360.

[23] C. Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, p. 247; cf. A. Clayton, *Counter-insurgency in Kenya: A Study of Military Operations against Mau Mau* (Nairobi, 1976).

[24] J. Kiwerska, *Rozpad imperium brytyjskiego w Afryce* (Warszawa, 1989), p. 202.

[25] A. Clayton, D. Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya 1895–1963* (London, 1974), p. 353.

wire, with drawbridges and sentry posts at entry points and guard towers. Access to water was restricted and the inmates were forbidden from leaving the camp. Food rations were limited to cornmeal mush. Epidemics would break out often inside the camps: typhoid fever, tuberculosis, malaria, dysentery, vitamin deficiency, scurvy, pellagra, and kwashiorkor.

The formation of the detention camps, like the displacement of the Kikuyu into reservations, proved to have been an insufficient remedy – especially after mass arrests in April and May 1954. The British then decided to yet again change their strategy toward the Mau Mau and expand the camp network. They applied solutions previously tested in South Africa and the Malay Peninsula.[26] The colonial authorities assumed that over the course of several years, they would be able to destroy the Kikuyu who resisted their regime and transform the remainder of the tribe – endowed with the land stolen from the victims – into watchmen for the colonial government.

The Pipeline

'In regions undergoing a crisis, the ruling powers establish proving grounds for testing the methods of managing dangerous populations', observes Przemysław Wielgosz.[27] Among the examples of such 'proving grounds', the political scientist and cultural analyst names Kenya in the 1950s.[28] One British innovation introduced during the Mau Mau rebellion was the so-called pipeline – the name given to a complex network of concentration camps within which the inmates circulated. The term likely came from colonial officer Thomas Garrett Askwith.[29]

Suspected Mau Mau sympathisers were relocated to detention camps and holding camps, classified according to specific categories, and then moved into concentration camps, work camps for men, and special villages for women. Once outside the pipeline, inmates were still not free – they typically found themselves in guarded villages surrounded by barbed wire with watch towers within the reservations. In all, about 100 camps of different kinds operated inside Kenya in the 1950s (not including the growing number of guarded villages), with anywhere between 160,000 and 320,000 Kenyans overall having passed through them.[30]

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[26] Pawełczak, *Ruch Mau-Mau w Kenii 1950–1957*, p. 367.

[27] P. Wielgosz, *Gra w rasy. Jak kapitalizm dzieli, by rządzić* (Kraków, 2021), p. 85.

[28] Ibid., pp. 199–200.

[29] In his memoirs, published in 1995, Askwith lays the blame for installing the concentration camps on Governor Evelyn Baring and Minister for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd; T. Askwith, *From Mau Mau to Harambee* (Cambridge, 1995).

[30] M. Crook, 'The Mau Mau Genocide: A Neo-Lemkinian Analysis', *Journal of Human Rights in the Commonwealth*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2013), pp. 33–35.

In detention and holding camp (Mackinnon Road, Manyani, Fort Hall, Kiambu), the Kikuyu were divided into 'whites', 'grays', and 'blacks', the latter of which were deemed the most dangerous. 'Whites' were the most likely to quickly move to the reservation and into a barbed-wire village; 'blacks', in turn ended up in high security facilities where the death rate was the highest. In time, the system changed, with new categories being introduced using letters ('Z', 'Y', 'YY', 'XR') and numbers (e.g. 'Z1', 'Z2').[31]

The choice of location for a camp was not easy. Logistics was a primary concern – concentration camps were usually placed near railway lines (e.g. Athi River, Kamiti, Gatundu, Aguthi). Most 'black' Kikuyu were placed in Lodwar, Athi River, Kapenguria, Mageta Island (on Lake Victoria), Manda Island and Takwa (both in the Indian Ocean), as well as Saiyusi. 'Black' and 'gray' Masai and Kamba were moved to Mara River, Kajiado, Narok, and Ngulot. These camps were described as 'permanent exile settlements'.[32] In fact, they were special concentration camps that housed the most uncooperative inmates, as well as perpetrators of the gravest crimes. From there, one could only go to exile camps – elevated security facilities (Hindo, Hola, Mkoba, Mkowe).

The largest of the camps – like Langata, to the south-west of Nairobi – occupied several square miles of land. The number of detainees could reach above ten thousand on average. To erect a camp was not a particularly time-consuming task: the British simply marked out the area, surrounded it with barbed wire, and installed guard towers. Sometimes, existing infrastructure would be used (e.g. hangars, factory halls), adapted into large-scale dormitories. There was no provision for sanitary infrastructure – the matter was left for the inmates to resolve. With no toilets, excrement was typically collected in one corner of the camp. The water ration for the prisoners was also restricted; most of them mention having to drink out of drainage ditches and swamps.[33]

In theory, the pipeline was designed for adult Kikuyu men. However, a camp had also been created for female 'black' inmates in Kamiti, housing several thousand. The women shared the camp with toddlers and small children. Some were moved to Athi River. The Wamumu camp was limited to boys, though under-age inmates could be found in most facilities.

Prisoners were processed by stages, in a mechanical, routine fashion. First, they were ordered to hand in all items; then, they were told to fully undress.

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[31] Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, p. 253; M. Curtis, *The Web of Deceit: Britain's Real Role in the World* (London, 2003), p. 327. One important account of the functioning of various camps, prisoner classifications, and the practice of transferring the prisoners around are the memoirs of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee* (London, 1963) – one of the more active parliamentary politician in independent Kenya, who spent seven years in various camps (e.g., Kowopa or Langata) during the Mau Mau rebellion.

[32] Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, p. 109.

[33] Ibid., p. 144.

A disinfection followed, typically using harmful pesticides in cattle ditches. Heads were shaved; bodies beaten senseless. Then, inmates received a pair of pants, a blanket, and a metal bracelet with a number. They were placed in blocks arranged according to origin and age, keeping persons from the same region and of the same age apart. The British hoped that this would sow new divisions and inspire the inmates to confess, facilitating 'rehabilitation'.

An inmate was supposed to spend several weeks in detention camps and then continue up or down the pipeline. Due to subsequent waves of arrests, facilities filled up fast. In the camps, Africans were subjected to 'screening', 'concentration', and 'softening up' – assessment of their involvement with the Mau Mau. The three terms, 'screening' in particular, became synonymous with inhuman torture and dehumanisation: the pulling out of hair, beatings, electric shock, castration, ear-cutting, burning with cigarettes and fire, as well as sexual molestation, rape, sodomy using foreign bodies, animals, and insects, or forcible ingestion of excrement and urine. Screening teams comprised of soldiers, security service officers, settlers, and African loyalists, implemented measures such as 'running the gauntlet', lashing, shooting, and hanging of the 'sub-humans' suspected of collaboration with the Mau Mau. One popular form of torture was to lead the Kikuyu into forced marches in the heat of the day bearing buckets filled with excrement on their heads, beating anyone too weak to stand upright. Torture was administered in the cells, in solitaries, or during 'public spectacles' designed for intimidation. The Kenyans were deliberately starved by misplacing their food rations (hunger and disease were the most common causes of death). Bodies of dead Africans were left for the other inmates to bury in the immediate vicinity of the facilities, without any respect for funeral rites.

The experiences of the inmates of the concentration camps were meant to serve as a warning for anyone who would engage in actions aimed against the British. Work camps were designed for a different purpose, though the distinctions between the different types of facilities housing the Kikuyu soon became very vague. Initially, homeless and displaced Kikuyu would end up in work camps, mostly in Central Province (e.g. Gatunda, Githiga, Kamaguta, Kandara, Kangema, Kigumo, Aguthi, Karatina, Mukuruweini, Mweru, Othaya, Showground, Dondueni, Gathigiriri, Liliaba, Mbeu), some also in the Great Rift (Makutano, Marigat, Molo, Nyach, Perkerra). Conditions within resembled those in the detention camps. Inmates were mostly employed in irrigation works (e.g. in Yatta Furrow, Mwea-Tebere, Perkerra).[34] They built roads and bridges, cleared the bush. Camp Embakasi, in the outskirts of Nairobi, earned a particularly ill fame. There, inmates toiled in drastic conditions, building an airport (today, the primary airport in Kenya, named in the honour of Kenyatta). Another such infamous location was Manda Island

[34] Clayton, Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya*, pp. 354–55.

in the Indian Ocean. Due to the degree of brutalisation of the inmates, the facility received the ironic moniker of Mau Mau University.[35]

Women and children, as well as thousands of men, the elderly, and those released from the pipeline, ended up in the roughly 800 guarded villages, dispersed across the country. Visually, there was little to distinguish these places from concentration camps. They were surrounded with barbed wire and moats. Curfew was in effect. There were sentry points and prisons near the villages. The inhabitants could only leave their village a few times a week, each time supervised by armed guards. The condemned were tortured and raped. In all, about 1.5 million people passed through the camps and the guarded villages.[36]

Rehabilitation

In every camp, there were sessions of the Orwellian 'Two Minutes Hate' – drills during which British security forces were taught to dehumanize the Mau Mau and inspired to the use of violence. In the meantime, inmates were subjected to the so-called rehabilitation. The name referred to a set of activities ranging from 12-hour shifts of forced labour, through hours-long assemblies in the sun, to all-day broadcasts via loudspeakers intended to 'rehabilitate' them.[37]

The Mau Mau were treated like a disease in need of a cure – and if that proved infeasible, the 'infected' had to be killed. Colonial authorities brought in expert ethnopsychologists affiliated with the World Health Organization, who attached degrees of psychological health to 'racial' categories. The Mau Mau were classified as victims of mass hysteria and mania.[38]

Aid was oftentimes sought from missionaries who Christianised Kenyans by force. Masses, sermons, evangelising speeches, and sessions of exorcisms 'cleansing' the *muma* pledge typically took place on Sundays. Participants were forced to loudly perform religious and state songs and forbidden from singing in their native language. In some facilities, the British also introduced tools of visual propaganda – for instance, doctored pictures of Kenyatta that distorted his image or posters advertising the failures of the partisans. Meanwhile, there were screenings of films depicting the wonders of Great Britain. Radios were installed to broadcast news of British victories.[39]

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[35] Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, p. 201.

[36] C. Elkins [in conversation with: P. Zychowicz], 'Brytyjski gułag w Afryce', in: P. Zychowicz, *Alianci* (Poznań, 2020), p. 78; cf. D. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London, 2005).

[37] Pawełczak, *Ruch Mau-Mau w Kenii 1950–1957*, pp. 368–69.

[38] J.C. Carrothers, *The Psychology of Mau Mau* (Nairobi, 1955); id., *The African Mind in Health and Disease: A Study in Ethnopsychiatry* (London, 1957).

[39] Pawełczak, *Ruch Mau-Mau w Kenii 1950–1957*, p. 367.

The camp system in Kenya lasted almost a decade. Its dismantling was prompted by a number of factors, such as increased pressure from the Church Missionary Society and members of the Labour Party, who demanded that human rights be observed in Kenya (their activity increased in time with the elections in Great Britain, likely not a coincidence); regular 'blockages' to the pipeline; and increasing numbers of accounts in European press describing the inhuman treatment of camp inmates (here, in particular, the report of the death by beating of eleven prisoners at Hola in March 1959).

The state of emergency was not lifted until 12 January 1960. Less than a month later, on 3 February 1960, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan spoke in Cape Town, famously referring to a 'wind of change', the impending need to dismantle the colonial empire. As diplomat and journalist Kazimierz Dziewanowski noted, this marked the end of the time of 'imperial arrogance, aggression, and unbridled expansion'.[40]

Kenyan Concentration Camps

On 12 December 1963, Kenya gained independence and joined the United Nations and the British Commonwealth of Nations. Kenyatta became the first president of the country. Sovereignty was gained among heavy political battle and economic turmoil.[41] The situation in the east of the country was tense. Communities in the region – primarily Somalis, to a lesser degree members of the Borana, Gabra, and Rendille ethnic groups[42] – pursued independence themselves. Somalis were driven by the nationalist vision of Great Somalia: a state inhabited by Somalis, exclusively Muslim, extending from Somalia proper into the Kenyan North Eastern Province, the Ethiopia's Haud and Ogaden, and the then-French colony of Djibouti.[43] This pan-Somali project was a utopia; none of the neighbouring countries or former imperial powers would consider a renegotiation of postcolonial boundaries.[44]

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[40] K. Dziewanowski, *Brzemię białego człowieka. Jak zbudowano Imperium Brytyjskie* (Poznań, 2021), p. 705.

[41] H. Zins, *Historia Afryki Wschodniej* (Wrocław, 1986), p. 301.

[42] For more on the transformation of Somalia's social structure under colonialism, see: L.V. Cassanelli, *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900* (Philadelphia, 2016); *Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Report*, vol. 2b (Nairobi, 2013), pp. 103–09.

[43] I. Orłowska, 'Historia Somalii do 1991 r.', in: *Róg Afryki. Historia i współczesność*, eds J. Mantel-Niećko and M. Ząbek (Warszawa, 1999), pp. 300–01. For more on the development of Somali nationalism, see: S. Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge, 1963); J. Markakis, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (London, 1990); M.I. Farah, *From Ethnic Response to Clan Identity: A Study of State Penetration among the Somali Nomadic Pastoral Society of Northeastern Kenya* (Uppsala, 1993).

[44] K. Tlałka, *Somalia. Upadek i odbudowa* (Toruń, 2018), pp. 22–23; K.G. Adar, *Kenyan Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia* (Lanham, 1994), p. 8.

The Organization of African Unity was just as unenthused. At the time, a debate was also taking place in Kenya over the shape of government of the country to be. The federal model, which assumed a relatively expansive autonomy of local ethnic authorities (under the doctrine of *majimboism*) was trumped by the unitary idea advanced by members of Kenya African National Union (KANU) – a political party of a nationalist bent, established in 1960 and dominated by the Kikuyu, under the leadership of Kenyatta.[45]

Somalis boycotted Kenyan politics; they withheld their votes in the elections of 1961 and 1963 to manifest their dislike for the authorities in Nairobi. Attempts at mediation on the part of Great Britain went nowhere.[46] In early May 1963, units of Northern Province Progressive Peoples Party, an organisation of Somali radicals, conducted several assaults on Kenyan outposts. On 24 May 1963, the day of the popular vote, a massacre took place in Isiolo, a town inhabited primarily by Somali First World War veterans. Kenyan troops opened fire on protesting civilians. Soon, riots broke out across the entire province.[47]

In an effort to root out bastions of resistance of the Northern Frontier District Liberation Front (NFDLF), the government in Nairobi announced a state of emergency in 1963, two weeks after the proclamation of Kenyan independence. Additional troops and police units were dispatched to the province. Anyone who entered the five-mile exclusion zone at the border between Kenya and Somalia risked a prison term.[48] Decisions about the fate of thousands of Somalis, 'the warrants and sentences, all came from Kenyatta, sat behind the same desk that Governor Baring had previously occupied'.[49]

Between 1963 and 1969, the Kenyan borderlands became the staging grounds for a war. The Somali rebels received support from the government in Mogadishu. In Kenyan historiography, the conflict is commonly referred to as 'shifta war'.[50] The term *shifta* comes from the Amharic *sheftenat*/*shaffata*, and signifies an armed mob;[51] the name was typically given to troops involved

[45] Wójtowicz, *Partia w mechanizmie władzy*, p. 20.

[46] G. Prunier, *The Country That Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland* (London, 2021), pp. 22–23.

[47] D. Peterson, 'Colonial Rule and The Rise of African Politics (1930–1963)', in: *The Oxford Handbook of Kenyan Politics*, eds N. Cheeseman, K. Kanyinga, and G. Lynch (Oxford, 2020), p. 38.

[48] After a year, the zone was extended to 15 miles; H. Whittaker, 'The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Shifta Conflict in Kenya, ca. 1963–1968', *Journal of African History*, vol. 53, no. 3 (2012), p. 404; id., *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A Social History of the Shifta Conflict, c. 1963–1968* (Leiden, 2015).

[49] C. Elkins [in conversation with: P. Zychowicz], 'Brytyjski gułag w Afryce', p. 80.

[50] J. Markakis, G. Schlee, J. Young, *The Nation State: A Wrong Model for the Horn of Africa* (Berlin, 2021), p. 42.

[51] Prunier, *The Country That Does Not Exist*, p. 222.

in the forbidden wars among Somali clans, but after the Second World War, it also came to be applied to Somali partisans.[52]

Both sides of the conflict accused one another of massacres against civilian populations. Kenyans provided evidence of attacks by Muslim extremists on churches and schools – symbols of the Western world. KANU politicians demeaned NFDLF partisans as primitive, backward religious fanatics. Ryszard Kapuściński reported from one OAU summit that Kenyans described Somalia's demands as 'an instance of tribal fanaticism and of an expansionism that threatens African unity'.[53] The end result of this discourse was the image of an enemy analogous to the idea of the Mau Mau fostered in British propaganda: 'The internal other / enemy was defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, race, culture, and political ideology'.[54] In the words of Achille Mbembe, the discourse of the government in Nairobi wedded '[t]he desire for an enemy, the desire for apartheid (for separation and enclaving), [and] the fantasy of extermination'.[55]

The state of emergency continued long after the signing of the accords with the government in Mogadishu that concluded the Shifta War in 1967.[56] It bears some relevance that, due to the Bamburi secret protocol, Kenyan authorities received support from British troops, particularly the Royal Air Force, in their fight against the nomads.[57] The same units that had repressed the Mau Mau a decade before were now deployed in the eastern reaches of Kenya to fight the Somalis. One shocking account of the massacre of the Somalis at the hands of Kenyan soldiers – mostly Kikuyus working in tandem with the British as part of Operation *Fagia Shifta* (sweep away / destroy the bandits) – is found in the book *The Stolen Desert*, a memoir by Noel Lytton, British aristocrat and anticolonial activist.[58] In his account, one finds fragments that refer to the tactics deployed by Kenyan units, such as poisoning the wells or cattle, or laying mines, most of whose victims were civilian.

One method that Kenyans used in their fight against the Somali shepherds was a project the government in Nairobi dubbed *manyattisation*. In several East-African languages, the word *manyatta* signifies a household, a farm. What *manyattisation* amounted to was the forced relocation of about twenty thousand Somalis (mostly nomads, members of the Daarood clan[59])

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[52] Pawełczak, *Kenia*, pp. 261–62.

[53] R. Kapuściński, *Gdyby cała Afryka…* (Warszawa, 2011), p. 67.

[54] Wielgosz, *Gra w rasy*, p. 121.

[55] Mbembe, *Necropolitics*, p. 43.

[56] A.M. Kostecki, *Somalia. Zarys historyczno-socjologiczny* (Warszawa, 1976), p. 63.

[57] *Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Report*, vol. 2a, p. 20. For more on the subject, see: D. Branch, 'Violence, Violence, Decolonisation and the Cold War in Kenya's North-Eastern Province, 1963–1978', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4 (2014), pp. 642–57.

[58] N.A. Lytton, *The Stolen Desert: A Study of Uhuru in North East Africa* (London, 1966).

[59] N. Mburu, *Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity* (Trenton, 2005), p. 224.

into closed compounds. The number of *manyattas* gradually increased.[60] In the end, nearly eighty thousand people would inhabit them, roughly 25 per cent of the region's population.[61]

Manyattisation was implemented hastily in 1966, when supplementary elections to the parliament were held in Kenya. The debate over the confinement of Somalis in villages controlled by the army and officials became a major issue in the electoral campaign. Proponents of this solution claimed that *manyattas* increased security in the region and sped up modernisation of social structures of the nomadic communities. Opponents, in turn, stressed that the 'villagisation programme' was a tactic lifted from inhuman British policies of the period of state of emergency during the Mau Mau revolt.[62]

The *manyattas* looked very much like guarded villages. The nomads were locked up in makeshift camps comprised of buildings made of mud and corrugated iron and tents. The dwellings were surrounded with barbed wire. Sentry towers and gates were erected, alongside interrogation centres and auditoriums. The latter were used for lectures and meetings conducted by officials from Nairobi. Their 'lessons' were geared toward the indoctrination of the nomads, inspiring them to denounce members of partisan groups.

Schools and medical facilities in the camps were overflowing; there were shortages of school materials and medicine. Given the high temperatures in this region of the country, the placement of latrines in the vicinity of the barracks substantially increased the difficulty of organising the everyday. Infectious diseases repeatedly swept through the villages – among them kwashiorkor, dysentery, tuberculosis, and malaria. To go out of a *manyatta*, inhabitants needed a special permit (which was rarely granted). Importantly, they often came from different clans, which caused many conflicts within newly-formed *manyattas*. Most of the disagreements were over access to food. Because food transports arrived irregularly and were often stolen, former nomads were forced to learn the basics of crop farming.

Inside the villages – de facto concentration camps – acts of terror occurred frequently. The violence was aimed against men as well as women. Authorities in Nairobi deliberately sent young soldiers into rebellious provinces to accustom them to the necessity of applying the radical solutions mandated by the state of emergency. The use of violence in the camps was meant to serve as a rite of passage for the soldiers, inculcating a cultural norm.[63]

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[60] The initial list of locations included: Bulla Pesa, Garba Tulla, Merti, Sericho, Laisamis, Logologo, Jillo, Sololo, Hailu, Butie El Wak, Rhamu, Takabba, Bura, Balambala, Madogashe, Masalani, Ijara, Buna Gurar, Giriftu, Habaswein.

[61] H. Whittaker, 'Forced Villagization During the Shifta Conflict in Kenya ca. 1963–1968', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 45, no. 3 (2012), p. 352.

[62] Id., *The Socioeconomic Dynamics*, p. 404.

[63] *Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Report*, vol. 1, p. 113.

As a Somali account puts it:

> We […] feel that we were better off when we were under the colonial government than during the post-colonial period. During the colonial period, we did not have any problems because at that time we even had our own villages. After independence, our villages were destroyed. They were at Kiunga, Kishakani, Funambai, Vibondeni […], Ashwei and Materoni. These are the villages which were destroyed after independence. We were left with two villages […]. We did a lot of farming and exported a lot of farm produce during the colonial period.[64]

Somali accounts from the period often refer to phenomena such as 'killing days' (*guya da*) – unpremeditated attacks by the soldiers against the camps they were tasked with guarding. Somalis were beaten, tortured, forced into confessing cooperation with the NFDLF (practices that bring to mind the 'screening' designed to confirm the fact of taking the *muma*). Somali women were placed in brothels servicing the soldiers. The unruly were loaded up on trucks and driven out of the camps – their fate remains unclear to this day. They were most likely shot or left in the desert with no water.[65]

Gaafa Dhaabaa – a time that stopped – the name that Somalis from North-East Kenya give to the 1960s, consumed the lives of anywhere from two to seven thousand victims, most of whom died in the camps.[66] At the same time, Kenyans caused a vast economic crisis for the nomad communities by murdering Somali flocks of camels and stealing Somali cattle.[67] The results of these actions, conducted as part of the so-called *maendeleo* (progress), are still visible. Inhabitants of the region continue to be suspected of collaborating with terrorist organisations in the Horn of Africa and experience economic and political marginalisation from the authorities in Nairobi.[68]

Detabooisation

The question of concentration camps in British East Africa, as well as those that Kenyans erected for the Somalis, remained political taboo for decades.[69]

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[64] Ibid., vol. 2b, p. 233.

[65] One likely burial site is Garbatulla; ibid., vol. 1, p. 118.

[66] G. Prunier, *The Country That Does Not Exist*, pp. 12–13; *Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Report*, vol. 1, p. XI; *Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Report*, vol. 4, p. 12.

[67] According to estimates by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Somalis lost c. 90 per cent of their cattle; *Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Report*, vol. 1, p. XI.

[68] S. Bloch, *The Gaf Daba: Time, Violence, and Development in Mid-Twentieth Century Northeastern Kenya* (Madison, 2015); id., 'Stasis and Slums: The Changing Temporal, Spatial, and Gendered Meaning of 'Home' in Northeastern Kenya', *Journal of African History*, vol. 58, no. 3 (2017), pp. 403–23.

[69] E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, 'The Production of History in Kenya: The Mau Mau Debate', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 25, no. 2 (1991), pp. 300–07; R. Buijtenhuijs, *Essays on Mau Mau: Contributions to Mau Mau Historiography* (Leiden, 1982).

This was partly due to Kenyatta himself: the Kikuyu leader, first President of independent Kenya, sought to maintain relatively peaceful relations with the former metropole – a rational strategy for a young state with uncertain budget and rising ethnic tensions.[70] To the Mau Mau still hiding in the forests of Aberdare, he spoke in the following terms: 'Every insurgent will be granted land or work by the government and every one of them can breathe deep, because the air is now sweet with freedom. The land of Kenya drank the blood of the rebels and it will now yield a great crop. But hands are needed for the toil'.[71] In his memoirs published in the late 1960s, which cover the period of the Mau Mau rebellion, he repeatedly implores Kenyans to reconcile and seek concord with those that had fought for the other side a decade before.[72] For the independent Kenya, 'economic growth, not settling scores' was to be the priority.[73] The Somali question, on the other hand, quickly evaporated from the list of priorities of the government in Nairobi. Kenyatta continued to send forces into the border area, maintaining a state of emergency in the North Eastern Province.

The watershed moment in public discussion about victims of the British camps can be traced to the publication of Caroline Elkins' *Imperial Reckoning*, which won her a Pulitzer Prize in 2006 in the non-fiction category. This synthesis, whose appearance was preceded by the publication of a string of monographic studies,[74] builds on an extensive archival research, enhanced with testimonies of living Mau Maus. Elkins was the first to highlight the scale of 'archive clearing' that the British had engaged in – the removal of vast amounts of documentation that discredited the regime. Thanks to her efforts, historical studies that had for long argued that the victims of the rebellion were not limited to the 2-to-11 thousand Mau Maus – as the British had suggested – but numbered overall about 150,000 Africans, gained credence.[75]

Another aspect of the detabooisation of the camp question in Kenya are the attempts on the part of the victims of the pipeline to negotiate settlements. The catalyst for these challenges to the post-imperial justice system can be found in the opening of 1,500 previously secret documents on the Mau Mau, held at the Special Collections of the Foreign Office in Hanslope Park, in 2011.[76] In 2013, the High Court of Justice in London granted financial compensation to three citizen of Kenya (Wambugu Wa Nyingi, Paulo

[70] Bienen, *Kenya*, pp. 131–53.
[71] Cited after: Kapuściński, *Gdyby cała Afryka*, p. 100.
[72] J. Kenyatta, *Suffering Without Bitterness* (Nairobi, 1968), pp. 21–26.
[73] Pawełczak, *Kenia*, p. 237.
[74] See, e.g., C. Elkins, 'The Struggle for Mau Mau Rehabilitation in Late Colonial Kenya', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1 (2000), pp. 25–57.
[75] Kiwerska, *Rozpad imperium*, p. 204; Zins, *Historia Afryki Wschodniej*, p. 297; Pawełczak, *Ruch Mau-Mau w Kenii 1950–1957*, p. 368.
[76] Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, p. 238.

Muoka Nzili, and Jane Muthoni Mara). Soon after, the government of Great Britain admitted officially for the first time that the colonial authorities subjected members of the Kikuyu people to systematic torture. In 2015, the British financed the construction of the Mau Mau Memorial Monument in Nairobi – a symbolic site of remembrance. They also agreed to pay indemnities in the amount of 14 million GBP to 5,228 survivors of the concentration camps. The money was paid directly to the victims; every Mau Mau received c. 6,000 USD – an amount that can be deemed substantial in view of the average incomes in Kenya; but is that an adequate repayment for the pain that was inflicted? There is no consensus on the matter. Furthermore, this Kenyan victory inspired other inhabitants of former British colonies, even outside Africa, to file suits of their own.[77]

The detabooisation of the question of concentration camps that operated during the Shifta Wars poses a far greater challenge. It would have to be preceded by a de-ethnicisation of Kenyan politics, the quelling of ressentiments and tribalism. Indeed, reports of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, established in 2010,[78] helped spread knowledge about these war crimes among some of the Kenyan populace. The current context, both internationally (the dissolution of Somalia, the involvement of Kenyan troops in stabilisation missions in the Horn of Africa, terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists – mostly Somali – in Nairobi[79]) and internally (the presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta, in 2013–22; the presence of Somali refugee camps in Kenya; the devolution policy and the affirmative action programmes for minorities conceptualised in the most recent constitution, neither of which has come to fruition[80]) does little to further the process of reconciliation with the still economically and politically excluded Somalis from the east of the country.

Conclusion

The concentration camps that operated in Kenya served several functions, such as the elimination of political opponents, their isolation, the meting out

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[77] L. Nijakowski, *Ludobójstwo. Historia i socjologia ludzkiej destrukcyjności* (Warszawa, 2018), p. 227.

[78] The commission was created in 2008, the year after parliamentary and presidential elections. The vote was followed by ethnic strife. The purpose of the commission was to offer a retrospective account of the progress and consequences of the conflicts that took place in the territory of contemporary Kenya since the late colonial period until 2007. In 2013, four volumes of reports by the commission were published.

[79] Tlałka, *Somalia*.

[80] B. Popławski, P. Zakrzewski, 'Ewolucja sytemu konstytucyjnego Kenii', in: *Konstytucja Kenii*, ed. and trans. B. Popławski and P. Zakrzewski (Warszawa, 2017), pp. 30–34, 45–46.

of punishment, or the exploitation of labour. However, their main purpose was to degrade individuals and sever social bonds, break resistance – of the rebels in the 1950s, of the separatists in the 1960s. These were not extermination camps, 'death factories', facilities designed for genocide. The British did not plan a mass murder of the Kikuyu; neither were the goals of the Kikuyu genocidal in intent. True, both were inspired by racism, xenophobia, a belief in their own civilisational superiority, dislike of the politicking tribes, and a desire to maintain economic supremacy. In official documents, one repeatedly finds references to the civilising mission, social modernisation, the creation of a new type of citizen.

The actions of the British during the Mau Mau rebellion bore the hallmarks of a genocide. Their victims numbered between 130,000 and 300,000. The Kikuyu policy during the Shifta War can be understood as a form of ethnocide – the pursuit of elimination of an ethnicity in the process of political radicalisation, of deliberate dismantling of its cultural specificity, an annihilation of its social structure, and the forced abandonment of nomad life for a completely different identity.

One should not downplay the legitimising and political aspect of the camp system: the colonial officials who decided to create the pipeline lent credence to the persistence of the imperial idea, convincing the government in London to the rightfulness of maintaining the colonial relation (after Indian independence in 1947, Kenya became the primary candidate for the role of 'pearl in the crown of the Empire'). Meanwhile, for KANU, the establishment of a network of camps for Somalis testified to the efficiency of the leadership of the young state, reinforcing the prestige of the Kikuyu elites and of their leader, Jomo Kenyatta.

It should be noted, though, that – both in the case of the Mau Mau rebellion and of the Shifta War – the announcement of the state of emergency and its extension constituted a preventive measure by authorities convinced that the internal conflict would promptly escalate. By extending the state of emergency, Kenyatta – like Baring before him – had granted himself access to an extraordinary means of creating the idea of an enemy and to brutally put him down. Kenya's *Hali ya hatari* (Swahili for 'state of emergency') meant not only suspension of the law, but also – as Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has demonstrated[81] – the emergence of a persistent spatial arrangement beyond the purview of the law. Located at the peripheries of the newly-established country, the camps – installed, said the Kenyans, to improve security in the region and modernise it – serve as a case in point. It is quite surprising in this context how easy it was for the former Kikuyu victims to transform themselves into ruthless executioners, a shift that created a new – postcolonial – context for the establishment of

[81] G. Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. K. Attell (Chicago, 2005).

concentration camps in Africa. Thus, in an ironic reversal inaugurated by the so-call Polish death camps, the 'British concentration camps in Kenya' became 'Kenyan concentration camps'.

Translated by Antoni Górny

Summary

The purpose of the article is to discuss the concentration camps established by the British in the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in 1952–60 and by Kenyan authorities in North Eastern Province in 1963–67, which recreated the system of camps established to incarcerate the Mau Mau rebels. It also presents the actions taken by the authorities in independent Kenya toward the Somali minority during the so-called Shifta War. The effects of the introduction of the state of emergency and the resulting spiralling of 'racial' hatred are examined together with the steps taken by the colonists towards the Mau Mau insurgents and members of the Kikuyu people. Particular attention is paid to the concentration camps that formed the so-called *pipeline*. The state of emergency regulations is presented, including the *manyattasation* project, which created the guarded villages into which Somali nomads were resettled. In conclusion, the article discusses the 'detabooisation' of the topic of concentration camps in Kenya at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Kontinuum przemocy. Obozy koncentracyjne w Kenii

Celem artykułu jest omówienie obozów koncentracyjnych zakładanych w Kolonii Kenii przez Brytyjczyków (1952–1960) oraz obozów koncentracyjnych tworzonych przez kenijską administrację w Prowincji Północnowschodniej (1963–1967) na wzór systemu obozów budowanych dla więzienia rebeliantów Mau Mau. We wstępie scharakteryzowano skutki wprowadzenia stanu wyjątkowego oraz nakręcanie się spirali nienawiści rasowej. Następnie przedstawiono kolejne kroki podejmowane przez kolonistów wobec powstańców Mau Mau oraz grupy etnicznej Kikuju. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na obozy koncentracyjne tworzące tzw. rurociąg. Omówiono rodzaje obozów i ich funkcjonowanie. W drugiej części artykułu scharakteryzowano działania władz niepodległej już Kenii względem mniejszości somalijskiej w okresie tzw. *shifta war*. Przedstawiono regulacje stanu wyjątkowego, w tym projekt *manyattyzacji* – założenia wiosek chronionych, do których przesiedlono somalijskich nomadów. Na koniec artykułu omówiono „detabuizację" tematyki obozów koncentracyjnych w Kenii na początku XXI w.

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